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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
A.K. & R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING
AND HEATING,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee.

Priority No. 15
No.20001009-CA

Vb.

THOMAS D. GUY and ASPEN
CONSTRUCTION, a Utah corporation,

Trial Court Case:
940300014 CN

Defendants/Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
Appeal from an Order of the
Third Judicial District Court
Summit County, Utah
The Honorable Frank G. Noel, Presiding
JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §78-2-2(4), Utah Code Annotated, the Utah Supreme Court transferred this
matter to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Was it patent error or did the trial Court abuse its discretion in refusing to grant
either Whipple or Defendants their attorney fees related to the 77 Thaynes Canyon
property after ruling that Defendants, after deducting the HVAC portion of Whipple's
1

claim, were entitled to a money judgment of $527.00, however, upon factoring in
Whipple's successful defense of Defendant's Counterclaim, Whipple had a net
advantage of $24,473.00.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "The Standard of Review on appeal of the
reasonableness of a trial court's award of attorney fees is patent error or clear abuse of
discretion." Faust v. Kai Technologies. Inc., 15 P.3d 1266 (Utah 2000)1
CITATION TO RECORD WHERE ISSUE PRESERVED: Defendants'
Memorandum of Points and Authority in Support of Defendants' Request for Attorney
Fees filed November 2, 1999, Record 1975; Notice of Appeal filed November 17, 2000,
Record 2050.
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULE
Utah Code Annotated §38-1-18:
§38-1-18. Attorney's Fees. Except as provided in
§38-11-107, in any action brought to enforce any lien
under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled
to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by
the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action.
Amended by Laws 1961, c. 76; Laws 1995, c. 172, § 4,
eff. May 1,1995.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1

Defendant incorrectly characterizes the issue as being the trial court having incorrectly
interpreted Utah Code Annotated §38-1-18 by denying to award Defendants their attorney fees,
rather the issue concerns the reasonableness of the fees awarded or in this case not awarded.
There is nothing in the record suggesting the trial court ruled that fees are not recoverable as
claimed by Defendants therefore the standard of review is "abuse of discretion" not "review for
correctness without deference to the lower court's conclusions."
2

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This appeal is from the final judgment (on

remand from the Utah Court of Appeals) of the Third District Court, Summit County,
which, after calculating Defendants' offset for the HVAC system towards Whipple's
damage award of $20,273.00, denied Whipple's claim for relief of foreclosure of its
$30,647.20 mechanic's lien,2 entered a judgment against Whipple in the amount of
$527.00, however, because Defendants' monetary recovery was negligible and they lost
their Counterclaim, the trial court considered the outcome "a draw" and declined to
award Defendants their attorney fees.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN COURT

BELOW:
Following an appeal (first appeal) by the Defendants (homeowner and general
contractor), the Utah Court of Appeals entered an order remanding the matter to the trial
court for disposition consistent with its opinion. A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing &
Heating v. Aspen Construction. 977 P.2d 518, 527 (Utah App. 1999). After remand, the
trial court held a telephone conference with the attorneys and set deadlines to submit
memoranda as to the remaining issues identified by the Utah Court of Appeals for
resolution by the Trial Court. The trial court held a hearing on November 10, 1999, at
which time the trial court heard arguments and took evidence (by way of affidavit) as to
the reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the parties. On January 20, 2000, the trial

2

See Addendum "1"- Whipple's Notice of Claim of Lien filed September 14, 1993.
3

court entered its Memorandum Decision as to the remaining issues - Record 2022. The
trial court, after calculating the offset for the HVAC system towards Whipple's recovery
entered a money judgment in favor of the homeowner and Aspen and against Whipple in
the amount of $527.00. The trial court declined to award either party their reasonable
attorney fees based upon an analysis which, while resulting in a monetary award to
Defendants of $527.00, actually calculated a net advantage to Whipple in the amount of
$24,473.00. Based thereon, the Court was of the opinion that the outcome was
essentially "a draw" and concluded neither party should be awarded it's fees.
Sometime in September, 2000, Whipple's attorney submitted Amended Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Amended Order of Foreclosure as directed by the
trial court in the Memorandum Decision. The trial court signed the amended pleadings
which were filed with the clerk of the court on October 18, 2000. On November 17,
2000, the Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal in relationship to the trial court's failure to
award the Defendants their reasonable attorney fees incurred in successfully defending
against the lien foreclosure proceeding in this action.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS: For purposes of this appeal Whipple

respectfully submits the following as being relevant for this appeal3:
1.

On March 18, 1999, the Utah Court of Appeals entered an order remanding

3

A detailed summary of the underlying facts in this case are set forth fully in A.K. & R.
Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Const., 977 P.2d 518 (Utah App. 1999), a copy of which
is included as Appendix "5." Addendum "5"to Defendants' Brief of Appellant.
4

this matter to the trial court for disposition of the matter consistent with its opinion
stating:
^[31 The Utah mechanics' lien statute provides "in any
action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter
the successful party shall be entitled to recover
reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court,
which shall be taxed as costs in the action." Utah
Code Ann. §38-1-18 (1997). In this case, although the
trial court initially granted Aspen's motion to dismiss
the HVAC portion of Whipple's mechanics' lien claim
because of improper licensure, it went on to award
Whipple the value of the work performed on Aspen's
property. Based in part on this finding, the trial court
concluded that Whipple was the prevailing party and
entitled to an award of attorney fees. However, this
conclusion may be erroneous in light of our
determination that §58-55-604 precludes Whipple
from recovering for its HVAC work. Based upon our
review of the record, it appears the HVAC claim was
the single most important issue in this case and Aspen,
having fully prevailed on the HVAC claim in this
appeal, may now be entitled to prevailing party status
under §38-1-18. If on remand the trial court
determines Aspen is the prevailing party under §38-118, then Aspen must be given the opportunity to
present evidence regarding attorney fees incurred in
pursuing its claim. We therefore remand this issue to
the trial court for a redetermination of the attorney
fees award consistent with this opinion and the entry
of findings necessary to support the revised award.
[Emphasis supplied by the Appellant.] (p. 525) A. K. &
R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr.% 977
P.2d 518, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999).
Shortly after the remand, the trial court held a telephone conference with the attorneys
and set deadlines to submit memoranda as to the remaining issues identified by the Court
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of Appeals for resolution by the trial court. (Telephone Conference with Judge Noel
held September 13, 1999.)
2.

On November 2, 1999, the Defendants submitted their Memorandum of Law

and Affidavit of Attorney's Fees which detailed the dates the work was performed, the
hourly rate, the time spent, and described in detail the nature of the services performed.
Additionally, the Defendants' attorney allocated the fees between: (1) the successful
claims for which there may have been entitlement to fees; (2) the unsuccessful claims for
which there would have been a claim for fees had the claims been successful; and (3) the
claims for which there would be no entitlement to attorney's fees. (Defendants'
Attorney's Affidavit - Record 1975).
3.

The trial court held a hearing on November 10, 1999, in Salt Lake City. The

court heard arguments and took evidence from the Defendants' attorney (by way of
affidavit) as to the reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the Defendants. Whipple's
attorney argued at the hearing that he could not allocate the fees, but after the hearing
submitted his affidavit supporting his claim for attorney's fees. (Record 2062, Transcript
of Hearing, Salt Lake City, Utah, November 10, 1999; Letter and Affidavit of Plaintiff s
Attorney filed November 12, 1999-two days following the hearing; see also Defendants'
Objection to the late submission filed November 17, 1999.)
4.

On January 20, 2000, the trial court entered its memorandum decision as to

the remaining issues. The trial court denied Whipple's claim for relief of foreclosure of

6

the $30,647.20 mechanics' lien and entered a judgment against Whipple in the amount
of $527.00. (Record 2022) The initial appeal and subsequent remand involved three (3)
separate lien foreclosure matters which were consolidated for trial.4 The trial court held
for Whipple on the other two (2) lien foreclosure matters, determined the lien amounts
($631.00 and $1,666.00 respectively), found Whipple to be the ''successful party" with
respect to those liens, determined reasonable attorney fees related to those lien
foreclosure matters (except as to attorney fees on appeal), and entered orders foreclosing
the other two parcels of property respectively. (Record 2022) (Those judgments of
foreclosure have subsequently been paid and satisfied by Defendant Aspen Construction
(except some nominal costs and additional interest).
5.

After deducting the cost of the HVAC system from Whipple's recovery

Defendants were entitled to a money judgment against Whipple for $527.00. However,
because Whipple successfully defended Defendants' Counterclaim for negligence and
the fact Defendants' recovery was based solely on a legal issue, the Court considered the
outcome as to the 77 Thaynes Canyon property claim as a draw and therefore declined to
award either party their reasonable attorney fees.
6.

In September, 2000, the Plaintiff submitted Amended Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law and an Amended Order in accordance with the trial court's January

4

The three lien foreclosure actions which were consolidated for purposes of trial are
referenced hereinafter for the convenience of the Court as: (1) the Dianne Quinn lien; (2) the
Tom Guy Poolhouse lien; and (3) the Thaynes Canyon property lien.
7

20, 2000, Memorandum Decision. These were subsequently signed by the trial court and
were later entered by the clerk on October 18, 2000. (Record 2029) On November 17,
2000, the Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal in relationship to the trial court's failure to
award the Defendant their attorney fees incurred in successfully defending against the
lien foreclosure proceeding. No cross appeal has been filed by the Plaintiff. (Record
2050).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Whipple initiated this lawsuit seeking recovery for a significant amount of work
which he had performed on the three properties which are the subject of this consolidated
action. Whipple was forced to go to trial on all three properties and was required to put
on a significant amount of evidence as to all three properties even though it was evident
during the course of the trial that there was no legitimate defense to Whipple's claims
relating to the Thomas Guy Poolhouse Property and the Diane Quinn Property.
At the conclusion of the trial Whipple had won on the merits on all of its
significant claims and the offsets afforded the Defendants were primarily the result of no
written agreements relating to the work in question and unfinished work attributable to
Whipple being discharged from the job by Aspen. The $7,000.00 award for damages
related to the HVAC system was extremely excessive and unsupported by any evidence
supporting what the cost of repair would be for the deficiencies identified in the trial
court's Minute Entry and should have been challenged by Whipple nevertheless,

8

Whipple accepted the result.
The coup de gras for Whipple was the evisceration of its claims by deletion of the
HVAC system changing the net money recovery on the 77 Thaynes Canyon property
from an $8,646.00 recovery in favor of Whipple to a $527.00 recovery in favor of the
Defendants due to, as the trial court stated, based on a "legal issue." Keep in mind the
trial court rejected Defendant's claims that the system was flawed and would need to be
removed at a cost of $25,000.00. The Court found the system to be sound except for
some minor deficiencies, many of which could be corrected with "fine tuning of the
system." (See Addendum "3" to Defendants' Brief for Appellants)
Upon consideration of the foregoing coupled with the recognition that after
deducting the value of Whipple's successful defense of Defendants' Counterclaim from
Defendants' net money recovery, it is clear that Whipple is still the "successful party."
The trial court's analysis of the facts as identified in the record and summarized in
it's Memorandum Decision carefully analyzes all of the facts of the case and reconciles
the factors to be considered in an award of attorney fees. Consequently, the trial court's
decision related to it's attorney fee award is reasonable and does not warrant reversal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE
ESTABLISHING AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT

9

Clearly Utah Code Annotated §38-1-18 provides for the award of reasonable
attorney fees to a successful party in an action to enforce a lien under this chapter,
however, considering Defendants have failed to marshal any evidence demonstrating that
the trial court has ruled that attorney fees are not recoverable in this action then
Defendants' appeal must be denied or this Court must find that Defendants' brief
demonstrates the trial court's refusal to award attorney fees to either party was patent
error or an abuse of discretion. In Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998), our
Supreme Court held:
"The standard of review on appeal of a trial court's
award of attorney fees is 'patent error or clear abuse of
discretion.'"
Nothing in Defendants' brief suggests the trial court's ruling constituted patent
error or an abuse of discretion nevertheless in anticipation that this Court determines
Defendants have marshaled sufficient evidence permitting the review of the trial court's
decision in the context of an abuse of discretion, standard of review, Whipple will
respond accordingly.
In simple terms it is Defendants' claim that because it received a net recovery of
$527.00 related to the 77 Thaynes Canyon property it is the successful party to this
lawsuit and thus entitled to its attorney fees in the amount of $30,902.89 and the trial
court's failure to award Defendants their fees is in contravention of this Court's directive
as contained in its opinion rendered in A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v.

10

Aspen Construction, 977 P.2d 518 (Utah 1999). Defendants' argument is flawed in two
respects, first, the trial court has broad discretion in determining what constitutes
reasonable attorney fees and so long as the trial court's analysis comports with the
criteria set down for the award of such fees the trial court's award should not be
disturbed and second, under a complete analysis of the outcome of this action Whipple is
the successful party.
POINT II
WHIPPLE IS THE SUCCESSFUL PARTY
As noted in the previous briefs filed by both parties, this was a trial that took place
over a five (5) day period. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court entered its
judgment which was appealed and after remand the trial court made the necessary
adjustments as ordered by this Court in its opinion rendered in A.K. & R. Whipple, 977
P.2d 518 (Utah 1999). The trial court's modified order is set forth in Addendum 4 to
Defendants' Brief of Appellants at Page 4.
As noted, the trial court's breakdown omits any inclusion of the result of
Whipple's successful defense of Defendants' Counterclaim of $25,000.00 although in its
discussion the trial court does refer to the disposition of this claim (see Page 5 of
Addendum 4). The fallacy of Defendants' analysis is its failure to factor in and offset the
value of this claim to all claims. Upon so doing, it is evident that the net advantage is
Whipples and it is only after the inclusion of this amount that a true and accurate picture
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of the outcome is obtained for the purposes of determining successful party status. The
complete analysis of all claims is as follows:
1.

Water and sewer laterals from curb to house

$3,200.00

2.

Plumbing ($14,158.00 less $2,000.00 for offsets)

$12,158.00

3.

Gas line

$1,015.00

4.

Backhoe

$100.00

5.

Water and sewer laterals from the street to the curb

$7,000.00

6.

HVAC $12,265.00 contract price less $3,092.00
to finish

$9.173.00
TOTAL DUE WHIPPLE $32,646.00

AMOUNT PAID BY DEFENDANTS:

-

$17,000.00

Offset for damages based on deficient work

-

$7,000.00

TOTAL DUE WHIPPLE $8,646.00
Less contract price per Court of Appeals

-

TOTAL DUE DEFENDANTS
Whipple's successful defense of Defendants'
Counterclaim in the amount of $25,000.00
NET ADVANTAGE
FOR WHIPPLE

$9,173.00
($527.00)

$25,000.00
$24,473.00

As noted above when factoring in Whipple's successful defense of Defendants'
Counterclaim Whipple is clearly the successful party even though the final judgment
resulted in Defendant being awarded a nominal amount of money damages and Whipple
12

receiving no award of money damages. Such analysis is the appropriate way to ascertain
successful party status. In Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143 (Utah. App. 1992), this
Court held as follows:
"...It is the determination of culpability, not the amount
of damages, that determines who is the prevailing
party." See Highland Constr. Co. v. Stevenson, 636
P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1981).
Accordingly, under a complete and accurate analysis of the outcome of all claims in this
action Whipple prevails and is entitled to successful party status.
POINT III
ATTORNEY'S FEES MUST BE REASONABLE
Our Supreme Court held in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, (Utah
1988), that the calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound discretion of the
trial court and will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of
discretion and while the Court acknowledged there was no set formula which controlled
the determination of a reasonable fee, the Court did establish a framework of questions to
be answered by the Court in assessing the reasonableness of an attorney fee award. The
Court held as follows:
"While it is clear that trial court's enjoy broad
discretion in evaluating evidence to determine what
constitutes a reasonable fee, there is little Utah law
providing practical guidelines for this determination.
(FN6) A brief discussion of earlier cases that have
listed factors the trial court should consider in
determining a reasonable fee is fundamental to our
13

analysis in the present case. In Wallace v. Build. Inc.,
16 Utah.2d 401, 402 P.2d 699 (1965), this Court
explained that what constitutes a reasonable fee is not
necessarily controlled by any set formula. 16 Utah 2d
at 405, 402 P.2d at 701. We stated: "What is
reasonable depends upon a number of factors, the
amount in controversy, the extent of services rendered
and other factors which the trial court is in an
advantaged position to judge."
In Travner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984),
this Court enlarged the list of potential factors by
including "the relationship of the fee to the amount
recovered, the novelty and difficulty of the issues
involved, the overall result achieved and the necessity
of initiating a lawsuit to vindicate the rights under the
contract." Id. at 858 (citing Turtle Management, Inc.
v. Haggis Management Inc.. 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah
1982)).
Finally, in Cabrera v. CottrelL 694 P.2d 622 (Utah
1983), which contains our most detailed analysis of
attorney's fees to date, the Court added:
the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the
attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness
of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee
customarily charged in the locality for similar
services, the amount involved in the case and the
result attained, and the expertise and experience of
the attorneys involved.
Id. at 625. The trial court may also take into
account the provision in the Code of Professional
Responsibility which specifies the elements that
should be considered in *990 setting reasonable
attorney's fees. (FN7) Id. at 624.
[3] Although all of the above factors may be
explicitly considered in determining a reasonable fee,
as a practical matter the trial court should find answers
to four questions:
14

1. What legal work was actually performed? (FN8)
2. How much of the work performed was reasonably
necessary to adequately prosecute the matter? (FN9)
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the
rates customarily charged in the locality for similar
services? (FN 10)
4. Are there circumstances which require
consideration of additional factors, including those
listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility?
Upon review of the trial court's decision relative to the issue of attorney fees, it is clear
that the Court considered all of the factors identified in Dixie. Set forth hereafter is a
reconciliation of the trial court's analysis as contained in its Memorandum Decision
(Addendum to Brief of Appellant) with the factors set forth in Dixie.
DIXIE CRITERIA

TRIAL COURT'S ANALYSIS

1. What legal work was actually
performed? (FN8)

Both parties submitted affidavits
of attorney fees.
(Defendant's Attorney's AffidavitRecord 1975; Affidavit of Plaintiff s
Attorney-Record 2062; and Plaintiffs
Exhibit 4a)

2. How much of the work performed
was reasonably necessary to
adequately prosecute the matter? (FN9)

The parties' affidavits broke down
the work performed as to each claim
in their respective affidavits.

3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent
with the rates customarily charged in
the locality for similar services? (FN 10)

Both parties stipulated at trial to the
necessity and reasonableness of each
party's attorney fees affidavit.

15

4. Are there circumstances which require
consideration of additional factors,
including those listed in the Code of
Professional Responsibility?

The trial court considered the following
factors as well:
(a) Relationship of the fee to the
amount recovered.
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the
issues and litigation.
(c)
The overall result achieved.
(d)
The amount involved in the
case and the result obtained.
See Addendum 4 to Defendants' Brief.

Clearly the trial court's analysis more than addresses the factors set forth in Dixie
and therefore demonstrates that the trial court's decision to not award either party its
attorney fees was reasonable under the facts of this case and not patent error or a clear
abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
The trial court never construed Utah Code Annotated §38-1-18 as denying the
successful party to an action brought under this chapter the right to recover its attorney
fees, only that based upon its analysis of the facts considered in the context of prevailing
case law, neither Defendants or Whipple should be awarded its fees. Consequently, the
standard of review of the trial court's decision is patent error or clear abuse of discretion
and in light of Defendants' failure to marshal any evidence or even allege an abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court, their appeal must be denied. However, if this
court determines that Defendants have marshaled adequate evidence for a review of the
trial court's decision on the basis of an abuse of discretion standard, Whipple maintains

16

that the trial court's decision passes muster when analyzed in the context of the criteria
established for determining the reasonableness of an attorney fee award as outlined in
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, (Utah 1988) and its progeny. Accordingly,
Whipple contends that there is no basis to find an abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court in its decision not to award either party its attorney fees.
In addition to the foregoing Whipple has established that it was the successful
party when factoring in its successful defense of Defendant's Counterclaim in the
amount of $25,000.00. Upon offsetting this amount against Defendant's net money
award of $527.00, Whipple has a net advantage in the amount of $24,473.00. While
Whipple received no monetary award for its success of this claim the value in relation to
the total claims of both parties cannot be ignored or segregated out and must necessarily
be considered and factored in when determining successful party status. As noted in the
discussion supra it is the determination of culpability not the amount of money damages
that determines the prevailing party therefore even under a net recovery analysis Whipple
is the prevailing party.
The Court of Appeals should deny Defendants' appeal and remand this case back
to the trial court with instructions to award Whipple its attorney fees related to its
successful defense of the claims asserted by Defendants in the initial appeal related to the
Thomas Guy Poolhouse property and the Diane Quinn property and to award Whipple its
attorney fees related to this appeal.
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DATED this
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day of July, 2001.
Respectfully submitted,
-<*.

Vfsfy^

STEVEN B. WALL
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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